INTRODUCTION WHEN I REFER IN THIS
Edgeworth [4] presented this problem one hundred years ago, considering it the most fundamental problem in Economics. Since then it seems to have been the source of considerable frustration for Economic theorists. Economists often talk in the following vein (beginning of Cross [3] ): "Economists traditionally have had very little to say about pure bargaining situations in which the outcome is clearly dependent upon interactions among only a few individuals" (p. 67).
The "very little" referred to above is that the agreed contract is individualrational and is Pareto otpimal; i.e. it is no worse than disagreement, and there is no agreement which both would prefer. However, which of the (usually numerous) contracts satisfying these conditions will be agreed? Economists tend to answer vaguely by saying that this depends on the "bargaining ability" of the parties. ' This research was supported by the U.K. Social Sciences Research Council in connection with the project: "Incentives, Consumer Uncertainty, and Public Policy", and by Rothschild Foundation. It was undertaken while I was a research fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford. I would like to thank J. Mirrlees and Y. Shiloni for their helpful comments. I owe special thanks to Ken Binmore for his encouragement and remarks.
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Many attempts have been made in order to get to a clear cut answer to the bargaining problem. Two approaches may be distinguished in the published literature. The first is the strategic approach. The players' negotiating maneuvers are moves in a noncooperative game and the rationality assumption is expressed by investigation of the Nash equilibria. The second approach is the axiomatic method.
"One states as axioms several properties that it would seem natural for the solution to have and then one discovers that the axioms actually determine the solution uniquely" [11, p. 129].
(For a survey of the axiomatic models of bargaining, see Roth [13] .) The purpose of this approach is to bypass the difficulties inherent in the strategic approach. We make assumptions about the solution without specifying the bargaining process itself. Notice that in order to be relevant to our problem, these axioms may only either restrict the domain of the solution or be obtained from the assumption of rationality. Thus, for example, Nash's symmetry axiom can be considered as an assumption that all the differences between the players can be expressed in the set of utility pairs arising from the possible contracts and that there is no other relevant element that distinguishes between them. But, the key axiom in most axiomatizations -the "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives" has not received a proper defense and in fact it is more suited to the normative question (see Luce and Raiffa [9] and Binmore [2] ).
It was Nash himself who felt the need to complement the axiomatic approach (see [10] ) with a non-cooperative game. (For a wider discussion, see Binmore [2] .) In his second paper on the solution that he proposed [11], Nash proved that the solution is the limit of a sequence of equilibria of bargaining games. These models, however, are highly stylized and artificial. Among the later works, I mention here three, wherein the bargaining is represented by a multi-stage game. Stahl [19, 20] and Krelle [7] assume the existence of a known finite number of bargaining periods and their solutions are based on dynamic programming. Rice [12] uses the notion of a differential game. The bargaining period is identified with an interval, equilibrium strategies are the limits of "step-wise" strategies, and the lengths of those steps tend to zero.
In this paper I will adopt the strategic approach. I will consider the following bargaining situation: two players have to reach an agreement on the partition of a pie of size 1. Each has to make in turn, a proposal as to how it should be divided. After one party has made such an offer, the other must decide either to accept it or to reject it and continue with the bargaining. The players' preference relations are defined on the set of ordered pairs of the type (x, t) (where 0 ' x '-1 and t is a nonnegative integer). The two elements in which the parties may differ are the negotiating order (who has "first turn") and the preferences.
Two sub-families of models to which I will refer, are: (i) Fixed bargaining cost: i's preference is derived from the function y -ci t, i.e. every player bears a fixed cost for each period.
(ii) Fixed discounting factor: i's preference is derived from the functioin y * 6,', i.e. every player has a fixed discounting factor.
So my first step has been to restrict the bargaining situation to be considered. Secondly, I will give a severe interpretation to the rationality requirement by investigating perfect equilibria (see Selten [17, 18] ). A perfect equilibrium is one where not only the strategies chosen at the beginning of the game form an equilibrium, but also the strategies planned after all possible histories (in every subgame).
Quite surprisingly2 this leads to the isolation of a single solution for most of the cases examined here. For example, in the fixed bargaining cost model, it turns out that if cl > c2, 1 receives c2 only. If cl < c2, 1 receives all the pie. If cl = C2, any partition of the pie from which 1 receives at least cl is a perfect equilibrium partition (P.E.P.). In other words, a weaker player gets almost 'nothing'; he can at most get the loss which his opponent incurs during one bargaining round. In the fixed discounting factor model there is one P.E.P., 1 obtaining (1-82)(1 -8182). This solution is continuous, monotonic in the discounting factors, and gives relative advantage to the player who starts the bargaining.
The work closest to that appearing here, is that of Ingolf Stahl3 [19, 20] . He investigates a similar bargaining situation but which has a finite and known negotiating time horizon, and in which the pie can be only partitioned discretely. Stahl studies cases for which there exists a single P.E.P. which is independent of who has the first move.
The discussed bargaining model may be modified in numerous ways, many being only technical modifications. However I would like to point out one type of modification which I believe to be extremely interesting. A critical assumption in the model is that each player has complete information about the preference of the other. Assume on the other hand that 1 and 2 both know that 1 has a fixed bargaining cost. They both know that 2 has also a fixed bargaining cost, but only 2Especially considering that the perfect equilibrium concept has been "disappointing" when applied to the supergames, see Aumann 2 knows its actual value. In such a situation some new aspects appear. 1 will try to conclude from 2's behavior what the true bargaining cost is, and 2 may try to cheat 1 by leading him to believe that he, 2, is "stronger" than he actually is. In such a situation one can expect that the bargaining will continue for more than one period. I hope to deal with this situation in another paper.
THE BARGAINING MODEL
Two players, 1 and 2, are bargaining on the partition of a pie. The pie will be partitioned only after the players reach an agreement. Each player, in turn offers a partition and his opponent may agree to the offer "Y" or reject it "N". Acceptance of the offer ends the bargaining. After rejection, the rejecting player then has to make a counter offer and so on. There are no rules which bind the players to any previous offers they have made. , t ) (s, t + 1) iff (r,t2) zi(s, t2 + 1);   (A-4)   if r,, -* r and (rn, t1) ? (s, t9, then (r, t1) z (s, t2);   if r, -r and (rn, t )1(0, ox), then (r, t )1(0, ox) From (A-3) we can use the notation (r, T) (s, 0) and (r, T) $i(s, 0) for  (r, T + t) (s, t) and (r, T + t) $i(s, t) 
PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM
The ordered pair (f, A) E F x G is called a Nash Equilibrium if there is no f E F such that P(f, g) > P(f, g) and there is no g E G such that P(f, g) >2P(f, ).
The following simple proposition indicates that even after the restriction of the bargaining problem to our model, the Nash equilibrium is a "weak" concept. The above equilibrium highlights the inadequacy of the concept of a Nash equilibrium in the current context. Assume 1 demands s + E(E > 0). At this point of the game, 2 intends to insist on the original planned contract and 1 intends to agree to this offer. But if e is sufficiently small so that (s, 1) <2(S + E,0), 2 will prefer to agree to player l's deviation. Thus, player 1 may carry out a manipulative maneuver and offer s + e in the certainty that 2 will agree to it.
In order to overcome this difficulty (see also Harsanyi [ . . T (P-1) and (P-4) ensure that after a sequence of offers and rejections s ... 5 the player who has to continue the bargaining has no better strategy other than to follow the planned strategy. (P-2) and (P-5) ensure that a player who has planned to accept the offer 5T has no better alternative than to accept it, and (P-3) and (P-6) ensure that if a player is expected to reject an offer, it is not better for him to accept the offer. ... and {Bt}=22 4,6, where At(Bt) is the set of all P.E.P.'s in a game which starts at time t, 1(2) making the first offer.
LEMMA 1: Let a E A. For all b E S such that b > a, there is c E B such that (c, 1) ~-2b?)
REMARK: Lemma 1 states that for a to be in A, it has to be "protected" from the possibility that 1 will demand and achieve some better contract. Player 1 will certainly do so if there is b E S satisfying b > a such that 2 would accept b if it were offered. Player 2 must therefore reject such an offer. In order that it be optimal for him to carry out this threat, player 2 has to expect to achieve a better partition in the future; that is, there must be a P.E.P. c E B in the subgame that takes place after 2's rejection such that (c, 1) is preferred by 2 to (b, 0) . P(f, g) = (b, 1) > I(a, 1) z(a, T(f, g)) = P(f, g) in contradiction to (P-1)). From (P-3) P(flb, glb)> 2(b,0) thus, (D(fIb, gIb)T(fIb, gIb)) 2(b,0) and by (A-2) (D(flb,glb),i)>2(b,0) and , g I b) is the desirable c.
Similarly, it is easy to prove the following lemma. that (c, 1)',(b,0) . Let a E A. Then for all b such that (b, 1) >2(a, 0) there is c E A such  that (c, 1) (b,0) . REMARK: Lemma 3 states that if a is a P.E.P. then 1 should have a "good reason" to reject any offer from 2 which is preferred by 2 to accepting l's original offer. Assume that in a certain P.E., player 2 plans to agree to a in the first period (case B below). Consider b such that (b, 1) >2(a, 0) . Then, player 2 will reject a if he thinks that 1 would agree to b. Thus player 1 must threaten to reject any such offer b. In order that this threat be credible there must be a P.E. in the subgame beginning with l's offer which yields an agreement c such that 1 if there is no x that satisfies (0, 0)'..-(x, 1) (d1(x1),0)..(x1, 1) and (d,(x2),0)>2(x2, 1) In this example the first move by player 1 serves as a signal to player 2. Player 2 interprets l's signal s5 as an agreement to continue with a pair of strategies that yields the partition E(s1). Not every s5 may serve as such a signal, since 2 will agree to every partition that gives 2 more than 1 -c. The partition c(s1) must give 2 at least 1 -s5 + c; therefore E(s1)_ s' -c. A final restriction on e is that x0 -2c. Otherwise 1 would prefer to offer a partition that 2 "could not refuse" (some offer between c and x0 -c). This also shows that the P.E. outcome may not be Pareto optimal; both players prefer to agree to 1 -E(x0) at the beginning of the bargaining. 
LEMMA 2: For all a E B and for all b E S such that b < a, there is c E A such
LEMMA 3:
